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PAVED WITH GOOD INTENTIONS:
CREDITORS FACE A NEW
ROADBLOCK TO RECOVERY IN
MEXICAN BANKRUPTCIES
Timothy S. Springer*
I. INTRODUCTIONTHIS Note discusses how a Mexican debtor recently exploited a leg-
islative loophole to block creditors' road to recovery. In Decem-
ber 2010, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. (Vitro or the Company) filed a
voluntary concurso proceeding-Mexico's equivalent of a Chapter 11 re-
organization.' Vitro claimed intercompany debts incurred between its
parent holding company and controlled subsidiaries as unsecured debts
and relied on these claims to overcome objections from third-party bond-
holders. 2 While more mature bankruptcy codes prevent this strategy, Vi-
tro presented a matter of first impression for Mexico's relatively young
code.3 Moreover, Mexico's civil law system only fueled the procedural
chaos.4
This Note shows how giving company insiders standing as claimants in
Mexican bankruptcies will profoundly affect the flow and cost of capital
in Mexico.5 Part II of this Note discusses how Mexico's bankruptcy code
inadvertently allowed Vitro's strategy, and how its civil law system pre-
vented Mexican judges from correcting the oversight. Part III addresses
the events leading up to Vitro's bankruptcy and the Company's steps to
gain leverage over unsecured creditors. Finally, Part IV outlines why this
case sets a dangerous precedent for unsecured creditors and proposes so-
*Timothy S. Springer is a J.D. Candidate at the SMU Dedman School of Law, Class
of 2013. He received his B.B.A. in Finance from the Hankamer School of Business
at Baylor University.
1. Press Release, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., Vitro Announces Filing of Concurso Plan in
Mexican Court (Dec. 14, 2010), available at http://www.vitro.com/vitro-corpora-
tivo/docs/ingles/101214i.pdf.
2. Thomas Black, Vitro Creditors May Face Lengthy Legal Fight Over Restructuring,
BLOOMBERG (Dec. 9, 2010, 7:21 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-12-
09/vitro-creditors-may-face-lengthy-legal-fight-over-restructuring.html.
3. See Joseph Checkler, Vitro Case Challenges Mexico's 11-Year-Old Restructuring
Law, WALL S-r. J. BANKR. BEAT BLOG (June 13, 2011, 5:11 PM), http://blogs.wsj.
com/bankruptcy/2011/06/13/vitro-case-challenges-mexicos-11-year-old-restructur-
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lutions to counteract unfair advantages for debtors in Mexican
bankruptcies.
II. MEXICO'S CIVIL LAW SYSTEM AND
INSOLVENCY PROCEDURE
Mexico operates under a civil law system, as compared to the common
law systems of the United States and Great Britain.6 Judges in civil law
systems do not interpret, but rather apply the laws as written, collected,
and codified by the system's legislative body.7 As such, judges in "a civil
law system can often do nothing on issues where the law is silent."8 Ac-
cordingly, civil law judges emphasize the plain meaning of legal provi-
sions and often cannot deviate from a conventionalist interpretation,
even if the judge "can point to principles and goals that suggest that the
norm is unjust or imperfect."9 Unlike judges in a common law system,
whose opinions have precedential value, civil law systems do not have the
doctrine of stare decisis; rather, civil law judges' decisions bind only the
parties to the controversy at hand.10 By nature of the system, judges rely
on legislatures and constitutions to enumerate sufficiently specific provi-
sions to govern novel situations presented to the courts."
Mexico responded to a need for more specific provisions by overhaul-
ing its commercial insolvency laws in May 2000.12 Although this Note is
not intended to analyze the specifics of the new law-Ley de Concursos
Mercantiles (LCM, best translated as the Business Organization Act of
2000)' 3-some brief discussion facilitates an understanding of Vitro's
strategic steps.1 4
In the aftermath of its 1995 currency crisis, Mexico joined a worldwide
movement by legislatures to facilitate corporate restructurings and to
modernize bankruptcy laws' content and cross-border insolvency provi-
6. Victor Ferreres Comella, Commentary: Courts in Latin America and the Con-
straints of the Civil Law Tradition, 89 TEX. L. Riv. 1967, 1967 (2011).
7. See id.
8. Checkler, supra note 3.
9. See Comella, supra note 6, at 1972.
10. Id. at 1967.
11. See id. at 1972.
12. Eduardo Martinez, The New Environment of Insolvency in Mexico, 17 CONN. J.
INT'L L. 75, 75 (2001).
13. Arturo C. Porzecanski, Corporate Workouts in Mexico: The Good, the Bad, and
the Ugly, ISSUES IN INT'L POLIflCAL ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) (Center for Strategic
& Int'l Studies, Washington D.C.), Apr. 2011, at 1, available at http://csis.org/files/
publication/issues20llO4_CorporateMexicoSpeciallssuel.pdf.
14. For more detailed analysis of Mexico's LCM, see Martinez, supra note 12, at 75-78;
Lina Forero-Nifio, Note, Mexicana Airlines, One of the World's Oldest Airlines,
Files for Bankruptcy Protection in Mexico and the United States and Suspends
Flights Until Further Notice, 17 L. & Bus. REv. AM. 361, 366-70 (2011); William F.
Govier, Controladora Comercial Mexicana: A Premature Case Study?, 28-MAR
AM. BANKR. INST. J. 46, 46 (2009). For a discussion comparing differences be-
tween LCM and the U.S. Bankruptcy Code, see Jonatan Graham-Canedo, Com-
parative Analysis of Bankruptcy Legal Provisions From Mexico and the United
States: Which Legal System is More Attractive?, 6 DEIPAUL Bus. & COM. L.J. 19,
20-28 (2007).
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sions.15 The United Nations Commission on International Trade Law
(UNCITRAL) encouraged many Latin American countries to amend
their bankruptcy laws in the first years of the new millennium with its
Model Law on Cross-Border Insolvency.' 6 LCM's drafters intended to
bolster confidence in Mexican businesses and attract new investors to the
country.17 Additionally, LCM's appointment of federal, instead of local,
judges indicates the drafters' good intentions to eradicate serious
problems with corruption.18
LCM requires insolvency proceedings of multiple entities within a sin-
gle enterprise to be conducted together, unlike its predecessor, which
separated holding companies from their controlled subsidiaries. 19 Mexi-
can legislators attempted to consolidate these entities for equity purposes
to prevent "fraud and favoritism." 20 In fact, when initially denying Vi-
tro's concurso plan, the trial court recognized this change and noted "that
the legislature contemplated the possibility that related companies that
have a relationship of subordination might engage in acts of creditor
fraud." 21 But Mexican legislators still did not harmonize insiders' treat-
ment across related statutes when drafting LCM. Mexican tax laws and
regulations requiring public corporations to disclose information consider
controlling and controlled companies to be the same economic unit for
information disclosure purposes. 22
In comparison, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code treats insiders differently in
many different situations. 23 For example, the U.S. Bankruptcy Code
removes intercompany debt as unsecured claims by offsetting any genu-
ine intercompany liabilities with the related asset on the balance sheet.2 4
Likewise, at least one class of impaired claims must vote to approve a
debtor's reorganization plan without including any acceptance by any
15. Porzecanski, supra note 13, at 1.
16. See generally Rodrigo Olivares-Caminal, Corporate Debt Restructuring in Latin
America: New Developments-New Opportunities?, I.C.C.L.R. 254, 258 (2005),
available at http://www.ifblonline.com/docs/IFBL-Corporate%20Restructuring
%20in%2OLatAm.pdf.
17. Martinez, supra note 12, at 75. This goal of attracting investment mirrors UNCI-
TRAL's intent. Id. See also 11 U.S.C. § 1501(a)(2) (2006) (encouraging greater
legal certainty for trade and investment).
18. Martinez, supra note 12, at 76. To this end, Vitro exposes another well-intended,
but potentially failed goal of LCM. After originally denying the appeal, the Mexi-
can appellate court reversed itself after several high-powered individuals inter-
vened on Vitro's behalf. Porzecanski, supra note 13, at 5.
19. Ley de Concursos Mercantiles [LCM] [Bankruptcy Law], as amended, art. 15,
Diario Oficial de la Federaci6n [DO], 27 de Diciembre de 2007 (Mex.).
20. Concurso. Judgment on Commercial Bankruptcy with Preexisting Reorganization
Plan, United Mexican States Federal Judiciary District Court Number Two For
Civil and Labor Matters in the State of Nuevo Le6n, Commercial Bankruptcy 38/
2010-VI, Pigina 49, 67 n.13 (Mex.) (on file with author).
21. Id. at 62.
22. Id. at 65.
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(31)(C)(v) (2006) (defining an "insider" as a "person in control
of the debtor"); id. § 547(i) (extending the preference period for insiders from
ninety days to one year); id. § 548(a)(1)(B)(ii)(IV) (providing trustee ability to
avoid certain transfers to benefit an insider in fraudulent transfer actions).
24. See Govier, supra note 14, at 47.
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insider.25
Despite recognizing the Mexican legislature's intention to combine
controlled entities, the trial court, as explained in Part III, was likely try-
ing to force a change in the law.2 6 LCM provides no specific counterpart
to the doctrine of equitable subordination, 27 which allows a bankruptcy
court to change the payment order of claims as equity requires.28 By not
dictating a comparable procedure in LCM, Mexican legislators granted
insider subsidiaries leave to make claims equally alongside third-party
creditors. 29
III. VITRO'S DEBTS, DEALINGS, AND DOWNTURN
A. GLASS HOUSE AND FINANCIAL STONES
Vitro began operations in 1909 as a corporation with variable capital
under Mexican law.30 As one of the largest glass manufacturers in the
world, Vitro produces, promotes, and distributes a range of glass products
for the wine, beer, cosmetic, pharmaceutical, food and beverage, automo-
tive, and construction industries.31 The Company has distribution centers
in eleven countries throughout the Americas and Europe with approxi-
mately eighty-five percent of the 17,000 workers living in Mexico. 3 2 In
2003 and 2007, Vitro raised a total of $1.2 billion through three separate
senior unsecured bond indentures (the Old Notes).33 Vitro and substan-
tially all of its direct and indirect subsidiaries guaranteed the Old Notes. 3 4
The global financial downturn of 2008 depressed sales and adversely
affected demand for Vitro's key industries.35 Specifically, the collapse of
the automotive and construction markets in the United States crippled
two of Vitro's largest customer bases.36 Vitro's sales dropped thirty-three
percent in 2009.37 Additionally, Vitro faced significant margin calls from
derivative hedge positions strained by fluctuations in interest rates and
international currencies.38
25. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (2006).
26. Checkler, supra note 3; see infra Part III, note 66 and accompanying text.
27. Govier, supra note 14, at 47.
28. 11 U.S.C. § 510(c)(1) (2006) ("[T]he court may ... under principles of equitable
subordination, subordinate for purposes of distribution all or part of an allowed
claim to all or part of another allowed claim or all or part of an allowed interest to
all or part of another allowed interest.").
29. Govier, supra note 14, at 47.
30. Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V. v. ACP Master, Ltd. (Vitro), 455 B.R. 571 (Bankr. N.D. Tex.
2011).
31. Press Release, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., supra note 1.
32. Vitro, 455 B.R. at 574.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Black, supra note 2.
36. Id.
37. See Thomas Black, Vitro's Defaulted Bonds Soaring in Precedent-Setting Case:
Mexico Credit, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 1, 2011, 4:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.coc/
news/2011-04-01/vitro-s-defaulted-bonds-soaring-in-precedent-setting-case-mex-
ico-credit.html.
38. Vitro, 455 B.R. at 574.
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The reduced cash flows and sudden margin calls left Vitro unable to
meet all of its financial obligations. 39 As a result, Vitro stopped making
scheduled interest payments on the Old Notes.40 After Vitro failed to
make margin calls on its failed derivative hedges, its counter-parties initi-
ated litigation in the Supreme Court of New York demanding payment of
$240.3 million plus interest.41 By February 2009, Vitro announced plans
to restructure its debts.42
The Supreme Court of New York found Vitro and several of its subsidi-
aries liable in the margin call lawsuits. 4 3 Subsequently, Fintech Invest-
ments, Ltd. (Fintech) acquired the derivatives transaction counter-
parties' claims against Vitro.44 In December 2009, as part of its attempts
to restructure, Vitro settled with Fintech by exchanging promissory notes
in return for Fintech releasing judgment claims against the Company.45
Fintech also agreed to invest $75 million in the Company "to strengthen
Vitro's liquidity." 46 This single transaction generated approximately $1.5
billion of intercompany debts between Vitro and its subsidiaries.47 De-
spite the equity infusion, Vitro remained vulnerable to weaknesses in its
key industries.48
B. VITRO'S CHAOTIC PROCEDURAL PROCESS
Vitro began soliciting creditors' consent in November 2010 for a
prepackaged voluntary consurso filing.49 The company offered bond-
holders a cash tender or equity exchange with an approximately five per-
cent bonus payment for consent.50 A month later, after retiring only $30
million of claims with its 57.5 cent cash tender offer,51 the Company ex-
tended the acceptance deadline before proceeding with its concurso
filing.52
Vitro filed its prepackaged petition in Mexico on December 13, 2010,
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. See, e.g., Complaint at 2, Barclays Bank PLC v. Vitro Envases Nortedmerica S.A.
de C.V. (No. 600521), 2009 WL 6045772 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 18, 2009); Complaint
at 5, Deutche Bank A.G. v. Vitro Envases Norte America, S.A. de C.V. (No.
600612-09), 2009 WL 7233058 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Feb. 26, 2009).




46. Press Release, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., Additional Information on Transaction to
Strengthen Vitro's Liquidity (Oct. 19, 2010), http://www.vitro.com/vitrocorpora-
tivo/docs/ingles/101019i.pdf.
47. Vitro, 455 B.R. at 574.
48. Black, supra note 2.
49. Vitro, 455 B.R. at 575.
50. Black, supra note 2.
51. Id.
52. Press Release, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., Vitro Announces the Upcoming Filing of its
Concurso Plan, the Expiration of its Tender Offer and the Extension of the Expira-
tion Time for its Exchange Offer and Consent Solicitation (Dec. 8, 2010), http://
www.vitro.com/vitro-corporativo/docs/ingles/101208i.pdf.
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despite virtually unanimous rejection by unsecured creditors.53 To ensure
the required forty percent of creditors supporting the plan,54 Vitro
claimed its substantial intercompany debts were unsecured creditors and
included these claims in the forty percent.55 Vitro had approximately
$1.7 billion of aggregate third-party debt outstanding on December 31,
2010.56 This amount included $1.2 billion from the Old Notes.57 But Vi-
tro also had $2.022 billion of intercompany debts at this time, including
the $1.5 billion stemming from the Fintech transaction.58 Creditors im-
mediately objected to Vitro's insider claims, sparking a heated bout in
which the Company, creditor attorneys, financiers, and members of the
press traded punches. 59
Vitro's financial difficulties and bankruptcy filing produced procedural
chaos as unsecured creditors sought to secure position and rights to sub-
sidiary assets in the United States. 60 Before Vitro filed for protection in
Mexico, one group of unsecured creditors initiated an involuntary bank-
ruptcy proceeding under Chapter 11 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code against
fifteen Vitro subsidiaries in the Northern District of Texas.61 Other
groups of bondholders filed substantially similar proceedings in the
Southern District of New York on December 2 and 9, 2011.62 A day after
filing in Mexico, Vitro filed a petition in the Southern District of New
York and sought to invoke cross-border insolvency protections under
Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code.63 Chapter 15 confers some pro-
tections common to domestic filings to foreign debtors, such as the auto-
matic stay.64 Thus, Vitro halted adverse actions against its subsidiaries in
the involuntary proceedings. 65
On January 7, 2011, the Fourth District Judge for Civil and Labor Mat-
ters in the Mexican State of Nuevo Le6n rejected Vitro's attempts to use
insider debts and denied confirmation of the voluntary concurso plan.6 6
Because the decision disqualified Mexico as a viable forum for the re-
53. Press Release, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., supra note 1.
54. LCM, as amended, art. 339(11), DO, 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.).
55. Black, supra note 2.
56. Vitro, 455 B.R. at 574.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. Compare Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., supra note 52 (characterizing claims made by press
about the legality of Vitro's proposed restructuring as "baseless") with Black,
supra note 2 (creditors' attorney suggesting "that a substantial amount of [Vitro's]
intercompany debt is bogus").
60. Vitro, 455 B.R. at 575.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 576.
64. 11 U.S.C. § 1520(a)(1) (2006) (applying § 362(1) to stay the commencement or
continuation of judicial proceedings against a debtor within the territorial jurisdic-
tion of the United States).
65. See id.
66. Concurso. Judgment on Commercial Bankruptcy with Preexisting Reorganization
Plan, United Mexican States Federal Judiciary District Court Number Two For
Civil and Labor Matters in the State of Nuevo Le6n, Commercial Bankruptcy 38/
2010-VI, Pigina 49, 67 n.13 (Mex.) (on file with author).
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structuring, Vitro withdrew its Chapter 15 petitions in the United States
while it appealed the trial court's ruling, allowing the involuntary Chapter
11 cases to continue. 67 After a ninety-day torrent of positioning, an ap-
pellate judge in the Second Unitary Court of the Fourth Circuit in Mon-
terrey reversed the trial court on April 11, 2011 and reinstated the pre-
packaged plan.68 As a result, Vitro filed a new petition for Chapter 15
protection in the Southern District of New York.69 In response, the peti-
tioning creditors filed motions to administer the Chapter 11 and 15 cases
jointly and to transfer the consolidated case to the Northern District of
Texas.70
On August 15, 2011, the Fourth District Court for Civil and Labor Mat-
ters in the city of Monterrey affirmed the appellate court's ruling by an-
nouncing the ranking and priority of claims in the Mexican concurso
proceedings.7 1 The ruling established that Vitro's intercompany claims
were equal to other unsecured creditors and therefore Vitro had the right
to participate in approving the concurso plan.7 2
IV. VITRO'S DANGEROUS EXAMPLE AND STEPS TO
PREVENT MORE ABUSE
A. EFFECTS ON CURRENT LITIGANTS AND THE MEXICAN
BUSINESS COMMUNITY
The Mexican appellate court likely honored its civil law system's for-
malism by allowing the intercompany debts to vote as unsecured credi-
tors.7 3 LCM does not explicitly prohibit this practice. Moreover, this
decision likely did not substantially affect Vitro, its subsidiaries, or most
of the senior unsecured bondholders. 74
Most of the bondholders at the time the Mexican appellate court issued
its ruling would profit regardless of the decision.75 These investors had
bought the securities at a substantial discount following Vitro's default in
2009.76 Accordingly, most bondholders were seeking to maximize profits
under any recovery scenario.77 Vitro estimated its plan would allow un-
67. Vitro, 455 B.R. at 576.
68. Press Release, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., Vitro Wins Appeal; Begins Its Pre-Packaged
Concurso Mercantil Process (Apr. 11, 2011), http://www.vitro.com/vitro-corpora-
tivo/docs/ingles/110411i.pdf.
69. Press Release, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., Vitro Reports 1Q'11 Increase in Sales and
EBITDA (May 2, 2011), http://www.vitro.com/vitro-corporativo/docs/ingles/
110503i.pdf
70. Vitro, 455 BR. at 576.
71. Press Release, Vitro, S.A.B. de C.V., Vitro Notified by Monterrey Fourth District
Judge Regarding Rules on the Recognition, Grading, and Ranking of the Claims
(Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.vitro.com/vitro-corporativo/docs/ingles/110815i.pdf.
72. Id.
73. See Comella, supra note 6, at 1972.
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secured creditors to obtain about a sixty-eight percent recovery.78 Even
if Vitro's concurso filing was only worth some analysts' estimated sixty
cents on the dollar, most bondholders would still realize lucrative
recoveries.7 9
Despite these reasons appearing to minimize this precedent, Vitro
sends a potentially dangerous signal to other debtors seeking leverage.
LCM permits ad hoc committees of unsecured creditors, meeting certain
requirements, to form and to force debtors into involuntary bankruptcy
proceedings, much like in the United States.80 Vitro's filing was pre-
packaged and voluntary, but now debtors anticipating involuntary bank-
ruptcy filings have a way to circumvent the leverage statutorily granted to
the unsecured creditors forcing the involuntary proceedings.
Mexican businesses will suffer if insiders are allowed to force confirma-
tion of concurso plans.81 Recognizing the increased risk of diminished
position in restructurings, financial institutions will likely raise risk premi-
ums attached to corporate bond insurance for Mexican companies. 82 The
same institutions may even require that other countries' insolvency laws
govern contracts for investment in Mexico. 83 An even more drastic re-
sult, capital flow into Mexico may decrease sharply as investors seek in-
vestments protected by more mature bankruptcy codes. 84
B. EFFECTS ON RELATED CASES IN THE UNITED STATES AND THE
OTHER NAFTA COUNTRIES
Significant economic realities between the NAFTA countries require
cooperation to maximize creditor value by simplifying procedural and
substantive provisions.85 Such substantive and procedural differences be-
tween the NAFTA countries would violate UNCITRAL's universalism
principle.86 This principle promotes continuity and predictability be-
tween different courts in the NAFTA countries.87 The United States
took steps towards harmonizing its bankruptcy procedures with the other
NAFTA countries in 2005 by integrating many of UNCITRAL's cross-
border insolvency provisions.88 Under the new provisions of Chapter 15,
U.S. courts must cooperate with Mexican courts in cross-border insol-
78. Black, supra note 2.
79. Black, supra note 37.
80. Compare LCM, as amended, art. 9(I)-(II), DO, 12 de Mayo de 2000 (Mex.) (two or
more merchants each with at least thirty-five percent of their claims more than
thirty days past due) with 11 U.S.C. § 303(b)(1) (2006) (requiring at least three
creditors with non-contingent claims aggregating at least $14,425).
81. See Porzecanski, supra note 13, at 5.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Checkler, supra note 3.
85. Emilie Beavers, Note, Bankruptcy Law Harmonization in the NAFTA Countries:
The Case of the United States and Mexico, 2003 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 965, 966
(2003).
86. See id. at 966 n.1, 967 n.3.
87. See id. at 966 n.2, 968 n.4.
88. Graham-Canedo, supra note 14, at 20-21 & n.14; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1501 (2011).
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vency cases where Mexico is the location/forum of the "foreign main pro-
ceeding." 89 But by permitting an action prohibited in the United States,
Mexico places U.S. courts in difficult legal waters.
In the present case, U.S. courts hearing proceedings related to Vitro's
subsidiaries have to respect Mexico's classification of Vitro and its subsid-
iaries as separate. 90 For example, U.S. bankruptcy judges have discretion
to award reasonable attorney's fees to the alleged debtor after dismissing
involuntary petitions. 91 Section 303(i) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code also
allows for punitive damages where the creditor forcing bankruptcy filed
in bad faith.92 Here, a U.S. bankruptcy court for the Northern District of
Texas dismissed several involuntary Chapter 11 cases against Vitro sub-
sidiaries following the Mexican Appellate Court reinstating the concurso
plan.9 3 When considering whether the creditors acted in bad faith by ini-
tiating the involuntary proceedings, the court would have to consider the
parent company and subsidiaries as separate entities. 94
U.S. bankruptcy courts have authority to refuse to take an action gov-
erned under Chapter 15 of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code that would mani-
festly contradict public policy.95 This provision mirrors UNCITRAL
Model Law article 6,96 but the standard of "manifestly contrary" has con-
sistently been narrowly interpreted by courts around the world to mean
violating "the most fundamental policies" of the host nation.97 Addition-
ally, domestic bankruptcy judges face pressures from the same economic
realities compelling cooperation in cross-border insolvencies. U.S. courts
are thus caught in the somewhat awkward position of becoming complicit
in wrongs not quite "bad enough" to overcome a high legal standard.
C. STEPS TO CORRECT OVERSIGHT AND PREVENT FUTURE ABUSE
Mexico's civil law system provides two solutions to prevent these unin-
tended consequences. First, the Mexican legislature created LCM and
can amend it.98 The Mexican legislature can bar future insider claims by
amending article 15 to include such an explicit provision. Less dramati-
89. 11 U.S.C. § 1525 (2006) ("[T]he court shall cooperate to the maximum extent pos-
sible with a foreign court . . ."); see also id. § 1502(4) (2006) ("'foreign main pro-
ceeding' means a foreign proceeding pending in the country where the debtor has
the center of its main interests").
90. See id. § 1508 ("[T]he court shall ... promote an application of this chapter that is
consistent with the application of similar statutes adopted by foreign
jurisdictions.")
91. Higgins v. Vortex Fishing Sys., Inc., 379 F.3d 701, 706-07 (9th Cir. 2004).
92. 11 U.S.C. § 303(i)(2)(B) (2006).
93. In re Vitro Asset Corp., No. 11-32600-hdh-11, 2011 WL 1561025, at *3 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2011) (mem. op.).
94. See 11 U.S.C. § 1508 (2006).
95. Id. § 1506
96. Model Law of Cross-Border Insolvency of the United Nations Commission on In-
ternational Trade Law, G.A. Res. 52/158, art. 6, U.N. Doc. A/RES/52/158 (Jan. 30,
1998).
97. In re Tri-Cont'l Exch. Ltd., 349 B.R. 627, 638 (Bankr. E.D. Ca. 2006).
98. Comella, supra note 6, at 1970.
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cally, the legislature could simply acknowledge the uniform treatment of
insiders under LCM as equal to that of Mexico's tax laws and regulations
for public corporations for information disclosures.99
Mexico's civil law system provides for a second possible solution. Pre-
cisely because civil law systems give judges little room for variation, many
Latin American countries have created an important tool for interpreting
constitutional law: an abstract review of legislation. 00 This procedure al-
lows the legislature to empower a judicial body to review a law for "con-
stitutionality on its face without having to wait for a specific controversy
to arise."o'0 Mexico entrusts its Supreme Court with this responsibil-
ity. 102 The Mexican Supreme Court could review whether LCM's failure
to provide creditor protections violates the Mexican Constitution. An ab-
stract review would allow the Mexican Supreme Court to reconstruct a
statute in compliance with the Mexican Constitution rather than nullify-
ing the provision altogether.103 But this procedure may be difficult to
initiate, as it requires significant support.104
In addition to the two potential civil law solutions, parties may have a
simpler private solution. Lenders may begin imposing contract require-
ments that companies will not vote intercompany debts to approve any
potential bankruptcy plans. 05 Private contracts allow future parties a
simple workaround, but also would require investors to renegotiate ex-
isting indentures. Likewise, private law solutions require confidence that
Mexican courts will enforce provisions not explicitly supported by stat-
utes. This belief provides the incentive for foreign investment without
exorbitant risk premiums.106 With no judicial support for these contrac-
tual provisions, investors may not have adequate leverage with borrowers
to contract around the insider loophole.
V. CONCLUSION: FIX IT, AND FIX IT SOON
Vitro's slingshot plan may appear to be only a small stone, but the blow
through a tiny gap in LCM's armor may indeed prove to be fatal. Mexico
must act quickly to quash the signal Vitro sends to other conglomerate
debtors considering concurso filings. Otherwise, lenders will raise the
cost of capital for Mexican companies enough to stunt the eleven-year
99. See Concurso. Judgment on Commercial Bankruptcy with Preexisting Reorganiza-
tion Plan, United Mexican States Federal Judiciary District Court Number Two
For Civil and Labor Matters in the State of Nuevo Le6n, Commercial Bankruptcy
38/2010-VI, Pigina 49, 67 n.13 (Mex.) (on file with author).
100. Comella, supra note 6, at 1968.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 1969.
103. See id. at 1972-73.
104. Constituci6n Politica de los Estados Unidos Mexicanos [C.P.], as amended, art.
105, Diario oficial de la Federaci6n DO, 5 de Febrero de 1917. Various govern-
ment officials can trigger reviews. See Comella, supra note 6, at 1970.
105. Black, supra note 2.
106. See Porzecanski, supra note 13, at 5.
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momentum following LCM's inception.107 Without action, Mexico will
leave creditors to walk a road to recovery paved with only good
intentions.
107. Id.; Checkler, supra note 3.
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